The Sahel Alliance Is Cracking: Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger Diverge on Security Strategy

When Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger announced the Alliance of Sahel States in September 2023, the message was clear: the three military juntas would present a united front against both jihadist insurgencies and what they called "neo-colonial interference." They pledged mutual defense, intelligence sharing, and a joint military force of 5,000 troops.

Two and a half years later, the alliance exists more on paper than on the ground. The joint force has been deployed only twice — both times in limited operations along the Mali–Niger border. Intelligence sharing remains minimal, hampered by incompatible communications systems and mutual distrust among security services.

The most significant development is Niger's quiet rapprochement with Western partners. In February 2026, Niamey signed a revised security cooperation agreement with France — the same country whose ambassador it expelled in 2023. The deal includes intelligence support, drone surveillance data, and training for Niger's special forces.

The pivot appears driven by pragmatism. Niger's uranium exports — critical for its economy — depend on logistics routes through Benin and Nigeria that jihadist groups have increasingly targeted. French and EU counter-terrorism support offers capabilities that neither Mali nor Russia can match in this specific corridor.

• Niger has also reopened discussions with the US about a limited military presence at Air Base 201 in Agadez.
• Niamey has signaled interest in rejoining ECOWAS under modified terms, a move that Mali's junta has publicly criticized.
• Russian military advisors were asked to leave Niger in January 2026, though a small contingent reportedly remains in Niamey.

Mali has taken the opposite path. The Goïta government has expanded its partnership with Russia's Africa Corps, the successor organization to the Wagner Group. An estimated 2,500 Russian military personnel are now deployed across Mali, primarily in the north and center, where they operate alongside Malian armed forces against Tuareg separatists and JNIM affiliates.

The partnership comes at a human rights cost. UN investigators and Human Rights Watch have documented multiple incidents of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, and forced displacement attributed to joint Malian–Russian operations. Russia's involvement has also complicated Mali's relationships with Algeria, a key neighbor that views the Russian presence on its southern border with alarm.

Of the three AES members, Burkina Faso faces the most dire security situation. JNIM (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), al-Qaeda's Sahel affiliate, controls or contests approximately 40 percent of the country's territory — up from an estimated 25 percent in late 2024. The capital Ouagadougou has experienced two major attacks in 2026 alone.

Captain Ibrahim Traoré's government has responded by recruiting volunteer defense militias (VDP) and purchasing Turkish Bayraktar drones. However, the VDP program has been criticized for creating parallel armed structures with minimal accountability, and drone strikes have caused significant civilian casualties in the rural east.

The divergence within the AES has several implications. First, it creates seams that jihadist groups can exploit — JNIM and ISGS (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara) have already increased operations in the tri-border area where coordination is weakest. Second, it undermines the narrative of a unified Sahelian sovereignty bloc, making it harder for any single member to negotiate from a position of strength.

For West Africa more broadly, the AES fracture reopens the question of regional security architecture. ECOWAS, weakened by the three countries' withdrawal, is attempting a reset under Senegalese leadership. Whether a hybrid arrangement — with Niger inside ECOWAS and Mali/Burkina Faso outside — can produce functional security cooperation remains to be seen.

"The Sahel does not have the luxury of ideological consistency. Security partnerships must be judged by outcomes, not origin."- Ibrahim Maïga, Institute for Security Studies, Bamako